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I. Introduction
Does a parent’s use of the social safety net have spillover effects on their children?
The answer to this question is important both for the welfare of the child and long-run
fiscal costs. Reforms curtailing the generosity of the social safety net could harm
children if the drop in parental benefit receipt leads to reduced resources or a worse
home environment. On the other hand, if decreased parental participation provides a
positive role model or otherwise changes perceptions about assistance versus work,
this could lead to better child outcomes and reduced government expenses. The goal
of this paper is to explore how a parent’s use of disability insurance (DI), a large
component of the social safety net in most countries, affects a broad range of children’s
later-life outcomes and the long-term government budget.
Arguments about the presence, type, and size of intergenerational spillovers have
figured prominently in policy debates for decades. Yet convincing empirical evidence is
scarce because a parent’s program participation is not random. Credible identification
requires an exogenous shock which affects a parent’s participation, but does not
directly impact their children. On top of this, one needs a dataset which links parents
to children, contains a detailed set of outcome variables, and follows families over a
long period of time. We overcome these challenges using a regression discontinuity
design (RD) coupled with rich administrative data.
Our context is a 1993 reform in the Netherlands which simultaneously tightened DI
eligibility criteria and lowered payment generosity. All new DI applicants were subject
to the reform. For those currently on DI, however, the application of the new versus
old rules depended on the participant’s age. Current DI recipients less than age 45 as
of August 1, 1993 were re-examined by a medical doctor and subjected to the new set
of rules which made them weakly worse off. Some of these re-examined individuals
received lower payments because their degree of disability was reduced, and others
were disqualified from the program entirely. In contrast, participants over age 45 were
grandfathered in under the old rules. This creates an age cohort discontinuity, with
current recipients around the cutoff being similar in all dimensions except for exposure
to the stricter DI rules.
Using an RD design, Borghans, Gielen, and Luttmer (2014) find that approximately
4% of DI participants exited DI due to the more stringent rules and that annual
benefits fell by around 1,000 euros, or 10% (unconditional on remaining on DI). A
similar analysis applied to our sample of parents reveals slightly larger effects, with
5.4% of parents exiting DI and annual benefits dropping by 1,300 euros. Even though
treated participants have been on DI for 7.5 years on average, they exhibit substantial
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work capacity, with over 60% of lost DI benefits being replaced with earnings.1 In the
short run, substitution to other government programs makes up another 30% of lost
DI benefits, but this effect tapers off over time.
Taking advantage of the Dutch reform and intergenerational data spanning more
than 20 years, we estimate how the reduction in parental DI benefits affects (i) a
wide array of children’s later-life outcomes (participation in DI, use of other social
assistance programs, earnings and taxes, human capital investments, arrests and
imprisonment, and adult mental health) and (ii) the government’s budget (fiscal costs
for each generation, including changes in DI payments, other social program receipt,
and taxes paid). The running variable in our RD design is the age of the parent and
the dependent variables are child outcomes. The DI reform affected parents on both
the intensive margin (payment amounts) and extensive margin (participation). While
it would be interesting to disentangle the separate effects attributable to each, this is
not feasible since the reform only provides one instrument. We therefore focus on the
reduced form effects, which are the policy relevant parameters from a tightening of DI
eligibility in a system which allows for partial disability (see Section B.).
We offer four sets of results on intergenerational spillovers. Our first is that there
is a strong link in DI usage between parents and children. Children whose parents are
subject to the harsher DI rules are 11% less likely to have ever participated in DI (-1.1
percentage points on a base of 10%). This is as of 2014, 21 years after the reform,
when children are 37 years old on average. Using cumulative income received from DI
as the dependent variable instead, children of treated parents receive roughly 1,600
euros less in DI payments, which is sizable compared to the mean of 10,100 euros.
Second, we find an increase in a child’s taxable earnings but no effect on par-
ticipation in other social support programs. Cumulative earnings up to 2014 rise
by approximately 7,200 euros, or around 2%, for children of parents subject to the
less generous DI rules. In contrast, we find no change in cumulative unemployment
insurance, general welfare assistance, or other miscellaneous safety net programs. The
estimated cumulative increase in taxes minus government transfers is approximately
3,500 euros per child. While roughly 45% of this amount can be attributed to cost
savings from lower DI payments, the remaining is due to increased tax revenue resulting
from higher earnings.2
Third, we find that child spillovers have first order fiscal effects. Compared to the
1Both partially and fully disabled individuals demonstrate substantial work capacity. See Appendix
Table A7 in Borghans et al. (2014)).
2The importance of accounting for broader tax and transfer effects when evaluating public
programs is made in a recent paper by Autor et al. (2019).
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direct effect of the reform on parents up to age 65 (when they transition off DI), we
estimate that children account for 21% of the net fiscal savings in present discounted
value terms (assuming a 3% discount rate). Extrapolating beyond, when parents are
no longer eligible for DI but their children still are, we calculate that 40% of the
budgetary savings is due to children. However, this is only a partial accounting of
the fiscal savings due to children. This is because the quasi-experiment we study
reduces program generosity for parents below the RD cutoff, while holding program
generosity fixed at the lower post-reform level for children. The full fiscal savings of
the reform for children is likely to be much larger, as we only capture the portion due
to complementarity between the parents and children, but not the main effect of the
reform itself on child DI use.
Fourth, we find evidence for spillovers to other domains, which helps provide a
fuller picture of the reform’s effects and insights into possible mechanisms. We find
intriguing evidence for anticipatory educational investments, consistent with children
planning for a future with less reliance on DI.3 When a parent is subjected to the
tighter DI rules, their child invests in a statistically and economically significant 0.12
extra years of education relative to an overall mean of 11.5 years. The largest increase
occurs for the margin of upper secondary school completion (roughly the equivalent of
High School in the U.S.), with a 2.2 percentage point rise. A second change is in the
area of crime. Children of parents exposed to the reform are 15% less likely to have
been arrested for a serious crime and their probability of imprisonment drops by 18%.
A third improvement is in the later-life mental health of children who were young
when their parents’ DI benefits were scaled back. These children reduce their use of
prescription drugs for mental health disorders in adulthood by 11%. The costs and
benefits of these extra improvements in child well-being are more difficult to quantify
in euro terms, but are also relevant for the public budget.
There are several potential explanations for our findings. We begin by ruling out
various possibilities which others have postulated for intergenerational spillovers. It is
not increased investments in children due to increases in family income or parental
supervision. This is because the reform caused parental leisure to decrease and work
hours to increase, with total parental income changing little in the short run but
declining in the long run. It also is not information about how to apply, as all parents
have been through the DI screening process. Likewise, reduction in stigma associated
3We note the education result is also consistent with a different type of anticipation driven by the
DI reform. Children could forecast their utility from being employed in the future will be higher
if their parent is also employed, and that getting more education will increase their employment
prospects.
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with parental entry into the DI program is ruled out, as the reform affects the exit
margin. Of course, if information and stigma only become salient when the child is
old enough to consider applying for DI, then whether the parent is still receiving DI
benefits when the child is an adult could have both information and stigma effects.
Instead, three explanations consistent with our battery of findings are that children
learn about formal employment, have a better home environment, or experience a
scarring effect. The sizable increase in employment for treated parents could help their
children learn about the labor market as well as provide a positive role model. This
explanation is consistent with increased child investments in education and reduced
participation in illegal activities. A related explanation is that children grow up in a
better home environment when their parent’s DI use drops. This is consistent with
correlational studies which document that long-term unemployment is associated with
increased rates of depression and stress within the home (e.g., Björklund, 1985; Di Tella
et al., 2001). Finally, children whose parents are forced off DI or have their benefits
reduced may infer they cannot rely on the government to take care of them, similar to
the scarring effect discussed in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) in a different context.
This type of scarring can explain why treated children invest more in education and
work more in the future, even though they face the same labor market and social
safety net as their untreated peers.
Regardless of the underlying explanation, our results suggest the reform curtailing
parental DI benefits had positive spillover effects on children, both from an individual
and societal perspective. Lowering DI benefits for parents did not appear to create a
resource trap which harmed children and prevented them from being self-sufficient,
even though parental income did not change in the short run and declined in the long
run. And from a government budget perspective, the resulting intergenerational fiscal
benefits were large. It is important to recognize, however, that our setting captures
the effect of lowering DI use for parents with marginal disabilities and substantial
work capacity. This is arguably the most policy relevant group, but care should be
taken not to extrapolate to other populations.
Despite the importance of intergenerational spillovers in policy discussions, there
is surprisingly little causal evidence. As surveyed by Black and Devereux (2011),
there are many observational studies, but few with credible research designs. The
best observational work uses panel data and family fixed effects (e.g., Bratberg et al.,
2015). Only a handful of papers have used quasi-experimental methods, with most of
these exploiting variation across U.S. states and over time for identification. Antel
(1992) uses state-level welfare benefits and net migration flows and finds evidence
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for intergenerational links. Levine and Zimmerman (1996) uses variation in state
benefit levels and local labor market conditions and concludes that most of the
intergenerational correlation in welfare use is not causal. Hartley et al. (2017) uses
more recent temporal variation across U.S. states in AFDC, TANF, and EITC benefits
and finds a mother’s use of welfare significantly increases the probability her daughter
will participate as well. Using a random judge design, Dahl et al. (2014) finds that
when a parent is allowed on to DI on appeal in Norway, it increases the chance their
child also participates as a young adult.4
Our paper makes several contributions to this sparse literature.5 We leverage a
nationwide reform which generates convincing quasi-experimental variation combined
with high quality administrative data. The rule changes we study are highly policy
relevant, as they allow us to quantify how children are affected when parents already
on DI become ineligible or have their payments reduced. This margin is likely to
have different effects compared to program entry (in part because a parent’s direct
experience with the DI program differs), which is what other work has focused on. An
advantage of our study is that we can follow children to an age in adulthood when
DI participation is relatively common. We also look at mothers, fathers, sons, and
daughters, while most studies focus on the mother-daughter link. Importantly, we
consider effects not only on children’s DI participation, but rather a wide range of labor
market, government support, education, crime, and mental health outcomes. This
allows us to better understand mechanisms and the overall impact of intergenerational
spillovers on children’s future well-being. Another novel contribution is the calculation
of the combined fiscal costs, including changes in a child’s DI payments, taxes, and
other transfers. This matters substantively, as the increase in child tax revenues
exceeds the reductions in child DI payments. We also provide a comparison of the
cumulative cost savings from each generation, documenting the importance of both
4Two related papers use a bounds analysis; Pepper (2000) obtains large confidence intervals, while
De Haan and Schreiner (2018) bounds average treatment effects to be substantially below most
quasi-experimental estimates which identify local treatment effects. While intergenerational links are
not the focus of the paper, Deshpande (2016; see Appendix Figure A7) leverages a policy change
which removed low-income youth from SSI and finds no effect on the combined outcome of fertility
and intergenerational SSI receipt. Another related paper is Aizer et al. (2016), which looks at the
long-run impacts of the historical Mothers’ Pension program on children’s outcomes.
5More broadly, our study complements a related literature which looks at other shocks to parents
and children’s outcomes. See Chen et al. (2015), Chetty et al. (2016), Dahl and Lochner (2012),
Katz et al. (2001), Milligan and Stabile (2011), Oreopoulos (2003), Oreopoulos et al. (2008), Rege et
al. (2011), and Stevens and Schaller (2011). There is also a related literature on disability insurance
programs and their labor supply effects. See Autor et al. (2016), Bound and Burkhauser (1999),
Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), Campolieti and Riddell (2012), de Jong et al. (2011), Deshpande
(2016), French and Song (2014), Gruber and Kubik (1997), Kostol and Mogstad (2014), Maestas et
al. (2013, 2018), Mullen and Staubli (2016), and von Wachter et al. (2011).
5
parent and child responses for the government’s long-term budget. Taken together,
our results highlight the strength and nature of parent-child interactions, and the
importance of considering spillover effects in policy debates about social assistance
programs.6
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides
background on DI in the Netherlands, the 1993 reform, and the data. Section 3
lays out our RD design and discusses threats to identification. In Section 4, we
present the effect of the reform on parents. Section 5 presents our results on child
spillovers in program participation and work and Section 6 discusses the resulting
fiscal implications. Section 7 documents spillovers in education, crime, and mental
health. Section 8 conducts some specification checks. We then conclude.
II. Background and Data
A. Disability Insurance in the Netherlands
The modern Dutch DI program was created in 1967 by merging two existing programs
covering workplace-induced injuries and disabilities unrelated to employment. The
program was generous compared to other countries, as it covered all workers fully after
their first day of employment, replaced up to 80% of wages, and included a variety of
subjective illnesses. Moreover, sickness benefits replaced a worker’s wages between
80 and 100% during the transition to disability insurance, and workers on sickness
benefits for a full year were routinely transferred to the DI program without a serious
reappraisal of their disability (Kalwij et al., 2014). These factors fueled a rapid rise in
DI recipients, from 4% participation of the eligible population in 1967 to over 8% by
1980. Modest reforms in the early 1980s were enacted in an attempt to stem the rise,
but were largely ineffective. Participation reached a peak of 12% in the late 1980s,
with payments ballooning to 4.2% of gross domestic product.
Starting in the 1990s, a series of reforms were implemented to control the spiraling
costs of the DI system, including reductions in benefit levels, tightened eligibility crite-
6This footnote highlights the differences between the current paper and the prior work of Dahl et
al. (2014). First, Dahl et al. study the intergenerational effects of making it harder for parents to
get onto DI in the first place (the appeals margin), whereas our analysis looks at reducing benefit
levels for parents who have already been on DI for many years. Second, the current paper has more
and better measured outcomes, including the intensive margins of DI and other social program
participation, cumulative earnings and taxes, crime, and mental health. The Dahl et al. paper could
not look at high school spillovers and lacked precision to identify college spillovers, whereas we find
strong intergenerational effects on high school completion. Third, we examine the fiscal consequences
of intergenerational spillovers. Fourth, we follow children for a longer time period (up to 21 years
later), including older ages when DI use is more common among the children.
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ria, changes to the sickness benefit program, and increased financing and responsibility
transferred to individual employers. The cumulative effect of these reforms was that
by 2012 the participation rate had fallen to just over 7% of the eligible population.
Going forward, the participation rate is predicted to fall even further as the stock of
older recipients transitions out of the DI program and on to the retirement pension
program. The trends over time are documented in Appendix Figure A1 and discussed
in more detail by Koning and Lindeboom (2015).
The current state of DI in the Netherlands is that payments now total around
2.1% of GDP (as of 2016). This compares to 2.3% in other European countries, and
1.7% in the U.S. In terms of participation, the Dutch rate of 7% is higher compared to
the U.S. rate of 5%, but lower than Norway’s 10%, for example. Several researchers
have proposed adopting aspects of the Dutch system to reverse steeply increasing DI
trends in the U.S. (Autor, 2015; Burkhauser et al., 2014).
Before continuing, we note several differences between the current Dutch and U.S.
programs. First, in the Netherlands, individuals can receive payments for a partial
disability and therefore continue to work and earn benefits simultaneously, while in the
U.S. disability determination is binary. Second, health insurance and other benefits
are unrelated to DI receipt in the Netherlands, but directly linked in the U.S. Third,
benefits do not depend on family size in the Netherlands, while they do in the U.S.
Fourth, the replacement rate in the Netherlands is not a function of tenure, with all
workers being covered 100% the first day on the job. Finally, the replacement rate of
70% for complete disability in the Netherlands is higher than the average U.S rate of
40 to 50% (see Borghans et al., 2014; Autor and Duggan, 2003).
B. 1993 Reform
Many changes are responsible for the reduction in DI expenditures in the Netherlands;
in this paper we take advantage of a 1993 reform which generates a discontinuity in
program generosity based on age. As this is the same cohort discontinuity used by
Borghans et al. (2014) to study benefit substitution, we only briefly explain the most
salient features of DI in the Netherlands and the 1993 reform, and refer readers to
their paper for further details.
In the Netherlands, individuals receive DI payments depending on the degree
of their disability, which is based on the calculated income loss due to a disability.
Calculated income loss is determined by comparing pre-disability earnings (in the
prior year) to a constructed measure of “earnings capacity.” The reform we exploit
affected the calculation of earnings capacity in a way which made DI less generous.
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The degree of disability is denoted in 7 categories which determine the replacement
rate;7 which category an individual belongs to is determined by the ratio of pre-
disability earnings minus earnings capacity to pre-disability earnings. Individuals can
continue to work and earn up to their remaining earnings capacity (pre-disability
earnings minus earnings capacity), and at the same time receive DI payments for the
fraction of lost earnings.8
To explain the cohort discontinuity, we first need to describe how earnings capacity
and benefits were determined before and after the 1993 reform. Prior to 1993, a
medical doctor examined applicants and created a subjective list of work activities
the applicant could still perform, based on a set of 27 physical activities (e.g., lifting,
kneeling) and 10 psychological abilities (e.g., the ability to work under time pressure).
This work activity list, in conjunction with the applicant’s education level, was used
to create a list of suitable occupations from a dictionary of occupational requirements.
The applicant’s earnings capacity was then defined as the average wage in the 5 highest-
paying suitable occupations which had at least 10 active workers in the applicant’s
geographic region. If 5 suitable occupations could not be found, earnings capacity was
set to 0. The calculated degree of disability was then binned into categories which
determined the replacement rate. Replacement rates varied from 0 to 70% of prior
earnings (see footnote 7).
The 1993 reform altered this process in two ways. First, it mandated the doctor
create a list of work activities based on a more objective medical diagnosis which
could be directly linked to functional work limitations. Second, (i) the list of suitable
occupations was expanded by no longer taking education level into account, (ii) only 3
suitable occupations were used to calculate earnings capacity, and (iii) the geographic
region of 10 active workers was expanded to be roughly three times larger. Each of
these changes weakly reduce the degree of disability for an applicant compared to
the old criteria, as remaining earnings capacity can only rise. Moreover, the new
rules make it more likely that enough suitable occupations can be found, reducing the
chances of total disability. The end result is that fewer individuals qualify for DI and
benefit levels are weakly reduced for those who continue to qualify.
All new applicants, regardless of age, were subject to the new rules. But for existing
7For a degree of disability between 80-100% the replacement rate is 70%, for 65-80% it is 50.75%,
for 55-65% it is 42%, for 45-55% it is 35%, for 35-45% it is 28%, for 25-35% it is 21%, for 15-25% it
is 14%, and for less than 15% it is 0%. In our data, we observe the category, but not the continuous
measure, for the degree of disability.
8Pre-disability annual earnings are indexed and subject to a cap (roughly 36,000 euro in 1999). If
individuals exceed their capped earnings exemption, DI benefits are reduced temporarily; if earnings
exceed the cap for three years, individuals are reclassified.
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DI recipients, the original 1993 reform specified that those age 50 or older at the time
of the reform would continue to be subject to the old rules. Since it was not logistically
feasible to re-examine all existing DI participants below age 50 immediately, they were
scheduled to be re-examined over the ensuing years based on their age cohort. They
started with the youngest cohorts under the age of 35 as of August 1, 1993. The 35 to
40 year old cohort was scheduled to be re-examined in 1995, the 41-45 year old cohort
between 1996-1997, and the 45-50 year old cohort between 1997-2001. However, on
November 12, 1996 the Dutch Parliament passed a motion grandfathering the 45-50
year age group into the old, more generous rules. This grandfathering creates a sharp
cutoff in the generosity of DI based on an individual’s age, a feature we exploit for
identification.
C. Data
Our analysis uses several data sources that we can link through a unique identifier
assigned to all individuals in the Netherlands. We combine administrative data from
several sources on the universe of children of DI recipients for the time period we study.
The disability administrative records begin in 1996 and are observed as late as 2014.
The records include information on the start and end dates of a spell, the binned
disability rating, DI payments received, and pre-disability earnings. The records do
not contain the medical doctor’s diagnosis, the list of work activities the individual
could still perform, or the set of suitable occupations.
We merge in data from a variety of administrative records for the period 1999 to
2014. We use data from Statistics Netherlands for earnings, self-employment, and
unemployment insurance which is compiled using information from three different
tax and social insurance record sources. This data starts in 1999. Unemployment
insurance in the Netherlands can last up to 5 years depending on prior work history.
Data on general assistance (traditional cash welfare) and miscellaneous benefit
programs come from the various organizations that administer the programs. As
opposed to the U.S., general assistance has no time limit in the Netherlands and
does not require dependents, although it is means tested. There are a variety of
miscellaneous benefit programs during our time period, most of which are small in
terms of benefit amounts and the size of the eligible population. This information
comes from the register which is used to determine eligibility and benefit amounts for
all Dutch social insurance programs. Additional details on many of these variables,
and how they are measured, can be found in Appendix B of Borghans et al. (2014).
We further merge in educational attainment as of 2014. The education data is
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complete for younger cohorts, but comprises only a sample for older cohorts.9 Crime
data on arrests and incarcerations come from two different data sources, and both
span 2005-2014. We also merge in information on prescriptions for mental health
drugs; this data is available starting in 2005. Finally, we use municipal registry files for
basic demographics. One advantage of this rich dataset merged from several sources
is that we can study a variety of spillover effects across generations.
Our data window focuses on parents who were between the ages of 40 and 50 and
on DI as of the reform date of August 1, 1993. Due to data availability, our sample is
limited to children of parents who were receiving DI benefits on August 1, 1993 and
who were still on DI in 1995. It is important to realize this sample limitation should
not create any biases. The reason is that 1995 is still before the DI re-examinations
took place for the age 40-45 cohort and before the passage of the DI rule change
exempting the age 45-50 cohort. Starting with 1995 affects the interpretation of
our estimates, but not their validity. We also require the child to be living at home
around the time of the reform and to be at least 25 by 2014 (so that they have had an
opportunity to finish their schooling and enter the formal labor market); as an extra
specification, we estimate effects for children not living at home at the time of the
reform date. After imposing these restrictions, we have a sample of 116,356 children.10
For the education analyses, our sample is smaller since education was collected for all
individuals in later cohorts, but only a subsample of earlier cohorts. For the crime,
arrest, and mental health prescription outcomes, we use the same sample restrictions,
but only require the child to be age 18 or older by 2014.
Summary statistics for both parents and children can be found in Appendix Table
A1. The first column displays sample means for parents who were between the ages
of 40 to 50 and on DI as of the cutoff date, and still on DI as of 1995. The other
two columns show means for subsamples on each side of the 45 year-old age cutoff.
On average, parents have been on DI for almost 7.5 years as of the reform cutoff
date, with the older sample having approximately an extra half year of participation.
Fifty-eight percent of parents are classified as fully disabled. Older parents are 10
percentage points more likely to be fully disabled, while younger parents have higher
rates of low-level disability. Parents in our sample are predominantly male, married,
9We have education information for approximately 70% of children. For the parent’s generation,
we only have information on education for 22% of the sample.
10We drop parents of Turkish and Moroccan origin, as birthdate is often incorrectly registered for
these individuals, and parents from the East Indies, as immigration rules were changing over time.
We further drop children whose mother was less than age 18 at the time of their birth, children with
missing covariates, and children with two parents on DI where one parent is treated and the other is
not (we include children with two parents on DI if both parents have the same treatment status).
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and native Dutch.
Appendix Table A2 shows transition matrices for a parent’s disability status in
1996 (before the re-examinations take place) versus 1999 (after the re-examinations
are finished), separately for the age 40-45 and 45-50 cohorts. The younger cohort was
subject to the stricter rules. But since both cohorts were re-examined, the degree
of disability could adjust upwards or downwards for both cohorts. As expected, the
younger cohort experienced much larger reductions in disability ratings. Take the
example of parents who were classified as fully disabled prior to the reform. For the
older cohort, 5.9% had their disability rating reduced (3.6 percentage point drop),
whereas for the younger cohort, 18.9% had a reduction (9.6 percentage point drop).
More generally, for the older cohort, 3.8% exited DI completely (either because they
chose to leave or were forced off), while 2.1% remained on DI but with a lower DI
rating. This contrasts with the younger cohort where 13.2% exit DI and 5.7% have a
lower rating.
Turning to children, their average age is 15.6 as of the reform date. Appendix
Figure A2 graphs the distribution of child ages separately for parents on each side of
the age cutoff for the main sample. There is substantial overlap in the two distributions.
The fact that we have a sample of somewhat older children is due to two factors
related to our sampling frame. First, few parents between the ages of 40 and 50 have
young children, as fertility is highest when individuals are in their twenties and early
thirties. Second, children in the Netherlands commonly live with their parents during
their early years in the labor market and while attending college.
III. Model and Identification
A. Regression Discontinuity Design
The discontinuity we exploit arises from the fact that the reform affected some DI
participants, but not others, based on their age. Parents who were age 45 to 50 as of
August 1, 1993 were subject to the old DI rules, while parents between the ages of 40
to 45 were re-examined according to the new, more stringent rules. The direct effect
of the reform on parental outcome yP can be modeled in an RD framework as:
yPi = α
P + 1[aPi ≥ c](gl(aPi − c) + θ) + 1[aPi < c]gr(c− aPi ) + δPxi + ePi (1)
where aP is the age of the parent on August 1, 1993, c is the cut-off age of 45, x is a
vector of pre-determined parental and child characteristics, eP is an error term, and
gl, and gr are unknown functions. The coefficient θ is the first stage coefficient for the
associated parental outcome (DI payment amount, or alternatively, DI participation).
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The corresponding reduced form model for child outcome yC is:
yCi = α
C + 1[aPi ≥ c](hl(aPi − c) + λ) + 1[aPi < c]hr(c− aPi ) + δCxi + eCi (2)
where eC is an error term, and hl, and hg are unknown functions. The vector of
control variables xi are the same in both equations, and include both parent and child
characteristics measured before the reform (see footnote to Table 1). The coefficient λ
is the reduced form (RF) or intention to treat (ITT) effect of the reform on outcomes.
B. Threats to Identification
Manipulation. The validity of an RD design requires that individuals cannot manip-
ulate the assignment variable, which in our setting is the parent’s age at the time of
the reform. Since parents cannot change their actual or officially recorded age easily
in the Netherlands, there is little chance for this type of direct manipulation.
Since the DI data is not available until 1995, a similar threat to validity is that the
reform caused differential attrition around the age 45 cutoff. As a reminder, our sample
includes parents who were receiving DI benefits on August 1, 1993 (the reform date)
and who were were still on DI in 1995. In other words, we can only observe whether an
individual was receiving DI at the time of the initial implementation of the reform if
they remained on DI until 1995. While the reform likely caused some claimants to exit
DI in anticipation that they would be re-examined, it is unlikely to have caused a jump
in exits around the age 45 cutoff. The reason is the re-examinations for individuals
age 40-45 did not start until after 1995 and it was not until November 1996 that
Parliament decided the 45-50 year old cohort would be grandfathered in to the old,
more generous rules.11
Borghans et al. (2014) perform two empirical tests for manipulation for their
sample, which includes all individuals on DI, and not just parents. They conclude
there is little evidence of manipulation. We repeat their tests, but for our sample of
parents and children. We first graph the histogram of parental age at the time of
the reform, and find no noticeable jumps around the age 45 cutoff. Using a McCrary
(2008) test, we do not reject the null hypothesis of a smooth density around the 45
year old cutoff (p-value=0.25; see Appendix Figure A3). Second, we find no systematic
evidence of changes in the distribution of pre-determined characteristics around the
reform date. Two out of 16 variables are significant, which is not much more than
would be expected by chance. Indeed, the joint test for all 16 variables has a p-value
11While 40 year olds were initially scheduled to be re-examined at the end of 1995, the re-
examinations took longer than initially expected. In conversations with the disability insurance office,
we learned that few 40 year olds were re-examined before 1996.
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of 0.20. (See Appendix Figures A4 and A5 and Appendix Table A3). Moreover, our
RD estimates barely move when we include these characteristics in the regressions.
Exclusion Restriction and Monotonicity. With no manipulation or differential attri-
tion (or any other reason which differentially affects which types of individuals are
found immediately to the left or right of the cutoff), the RD design identifies the
causal RF impacts. There is no need for an exclusion restriction or monotonicity.
Since the RF captures the policy relevant intergenerational parameters of a tightening
of eligibility in a DI system with partial disability, these estimates are interesting in
their own right.
A practical reason to focus on RF instead of IV estimates is that the DI reform
affected parents on both the intensive margin (payment amounts) and extensive margin
(participation). Since the reform only provides one instrument, it is not feasible to
disentangle the separate effects attributable to each.12 Consider the challenge of using
the extensive margin of participation as the instrument. To satisfy the exclusion
restriction, the intensive margin would need to not directly affect children’s outcomes.
This would imply a drop in DI payments from 10,000 euros to 2,000 euros has no
effect on children, and likewise that a drop in payments from 10,000 euros to 0 euros
and a drop in payments from 2,000 euros to 0 euros, have the same effect. This is
clearly not a reasonable assumption.
Now consider the assumption required to use the intensive margin as the instrument.
To interpret the resulting IV estimates as causal requires the exclusion restriction that
parental exit has no direct effect. This implies, for example, that a parental reduction
in benefits from 10,000 to 7,000 euros has the same effect as a parent who previously
received 3,000 euros exiting the program and receiving 0 euros. This assumption,
while not perfect, is more reasonable. Therefore, to facilitate a comparison to OLS
estimates, we present IV estimates which scale the effects by the parental drop in DI
payments in the online Appendix.13
If the effect of the drop in parental DI payments is constant for each child outcome,
then the absence of manipulation combined with the exclusion restriction are sufficient
for consistent IV estimation. With heterogeneous effects, however, monotonicity is
12If the effects of the reform on exit versus a drop in payments could be predicted based on
predetermined characteristics, one could interact these predetermined characteristics with the reform
cutoff to get a sense of the two margins. Unfortunately, there is not enough statistical power based
on pre-determined characteristics to make this exercise useful.
13The 1993 reform may also have triggered a variety of changes for exposed parents, such as
changes in parental labor supply, available family income, or even family structure. It is important to
note these changes do not violate the exclusion restriction. Instead, they are potential mechanisms
through which a shock to parental DI generosity affects children.
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also needed. In our setting, monotonicity requires that if a parent was exposed to the
new, more stringent DI rules, they must receive DI payments which are lower or the
same compared to what they would have received under the old rules. Since the new
rules weakly reduced payments for any individual whose situation had not changed,
monotonicity holds by construction for most of the sample. The one exception is that
if a parent’s illness has worsened, re-examination under the new, stricter rules could
still result in a higher degree of disability classification and hence a higher DI payment.
Comparing the 40-45 age cohort, which was exposed to the stricter rules, with the
45-50 age cohort reveals this is unlikely to be an important issue. For the 40-45 age
cohort, 5.8% of the sample had their degree of disability rating increase between 1996
and 1999, whereas for the 45-50 age cohort, 6.6% had their rating increase. This
comparison indicates that any margin for non-monotonicity to matter is small, even
taking into account that rating increases are expected to occur somewhat more often
for older individuals as their disabilities worsen. The bigger problem for IV estimation
is that exclusion restrictions are unlikely to hold.
IV. Effect on Parents
This section documents the effect of the reform on parents using an RD design.
An advantage of RD is that results can be presented graphically, which provides
a transparent way of showing how the intergenerational spillovers are identified.
Throughout the paper, we will begin with a graphical depiction of key outcomes before
turning to a more detailed regression-based analysis. The figures will include outcomes
aggregated into parental age bins, as well as separate linear trends on each side of
the cutoff estimated using the underlying data and baseline regression specification.
The regression lines best illustrate the trends in the data and the size of the jump,
whereas the binned means provide a sense of the underlying variability in the data.
Figure 1 graphs the relationship between the reform and parent’s intensive and
extensive use of DI. The sample is comprised of parents who were already receiving DI
benefits prior to the reform. The running variable is the parent’s age as of the reform
date of August 1, 1993 and the cutoff age of 45 determines whether the parent is
subject to the new versus old DI rules. On the y-axes are parental benefits in 1999 and
parental DI exit by 1999; we use 1999 since this is after all the re-examinations have
taken place. Our age variable is recorded at the monthly level; each observation in
the graph is the average DI payment for parents in six-month age bins. Three-month
age bins for this figure, and all other RD graphs, can be found in the Appendix.
The left figure reveals that DI benefit payments rise with age, largely reflecting
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the fact that older individuals have higher degree of disability ratings on average and
therefore higher DI payments. More importantly, there is a sharp drop in payments
for individuals just to the left of the cutoff. To document the extensive margin of the
DI reform, in the right panel we graph the fraction of parents who exit DI. The first
pattern to notice is that exits decrease with age. More relevant for our RD design, at
the cutoff there is a sizable increase in exits for parents exposed to the reform.
In Table 1 we present regression results corresponding to these figures. Our baseline
specification, here and in what follows, regresses the relevant outcome on a dummy for
the reform cutoff and separate linear trends in parental age to the left and the right of
the cutoff. We use triangular weights so that observations nearer the cutoff will have
more influence. Although the coefficients are not reported, we also include a variety
of covariates for both the parent and the child which are measured as of January 1,
1996 and listed in the footnote to the table. We use the same set of covariates in all
of our child outcome regressions.14
The first specification in Table 1 looks at a parent’s DI payments in the year 1999.
Mirroring what was drawn in the left panel of Figure 1, there is a sizable 1,300 euro
drop in benefits for parents exposed to the reform, which amounts to a 13% reduction
compared to the mean. The second specification uses exit from DI by 1999 as the
outcome, and finds a large and precisely estimated 5.4 percentage point drop at the
cutoff, which is roughly a 60% higher exit rate than otherwise would be predicted.
Both the size and the precision of these first stage effects are useful for identifying
spillover effects on children, as spillovers are by their nature second order effects.
As a reminder, some individuals exposed to the reform were kicked off the program
(extensive margin), while others remained on DI but with lower benefits (intensive
margin). While it would be interesting to disentangle the separate effects attributable
to each margin, this is not feasible since the reform only provides one instrument.
We therefore focus on the reduced form effects on children’s outcomes, which are the
policy relevant parameters for reforms of this type.
As a result of the reform, other parental outcomes changed as well. Borghans et
al.’s (2014) analysis finds a strong rebound in labor earnings of 0.62 euros on average
per euro of lost DI benefits and a 0.30 euro substitution to other social assistance
programs in the short run. These effects diminish in magnitude over time, so that
financial resources decline in the long run. We find similar patterns for our sample
of parents. These other effects are important to keep in mind when interpreting the
14January 1, 1996 is before the passage of the law exempting the 45-50 age cohort from the new,
less generous DI rules and before the re-examinations have occurred for the 40-45 age cohort, so
these controls should be exogenous to the cutoff.
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child spillovers we estimate in the paper.
V. Spillovers in Program Participation and Work
A. Child DI Participation
We begin our investigation of intergenerational spillovers by exploring the linkage in
DI participation between parents and their children. Figure 2 presents RD graphs for
the extensive and intensive margins of DI use. The x-axes are the same as in Figure
1, with the running variable being the age of the parent as of the reform date and
the cutoff age of 45 being marked with a vertical line. But now the y-axis plots the
child’s participation in DI, rather than the parent’s.
An advantage of our long panel is that we can measure outcomes when the children
are much older, after they have had a chance to live on their own, enter the labor
market, and participate in the DI program. For our main child outcomes, we measure
cumulative effects as of 2014, which is 21 years after the reform cutoff date. By this
time, children are 37.4 years old on average, with the range of child ages spanning
from 28 years old at the 10th percentile to 40 years old at the 90th percentile. Between
1999 and 2014, over 10% of children in our sample have participated in DI at some
point, with an average number of 298 days spent on the program (including zeros).
The left graph in Figure 2 looks at whether a child has ever participated in DI
between 1999 and 2014. There is a noticeable jump in child DI participation at the
parental age cutoff of 45. Likewise, there is a noticeable jump in the cumulative
number of days a child has been on DI in the right graph. Table 2 presents the
reduced form estimates corresponding to these graphs. For the extensive margin of
participation, there is a statistically and economically significant 1.1 percentage point
drop for children if their parent was exposed to the reform. This is an 11% effect
relative to the mean. Likewise, children participate in DI for 47 fewer days if their
parent was subject to the stricter DI rules, which represents a 16% drop relative to
the mean.
To arrive at the cost savings to taxpayers from the reduced DI use of children
because of complementarity between parents and children, in Figure 3 we plot an
RD graph with the dollar amount of cumulative DI receipt as the outcome. There
is a drop of approximately 1,600 euros in cumulative child DI benefits between 1999
and 2014. As reported in Table 3, this is a sizable effect relative to the mean of 10
thousand euros in DI receipt (including zeros).
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B. Other Government Transfer Programs
We next look at other government transfer programs. This is important, because if
children are simply shifting from one social assistance program to another, the cost
savings to the government from children’s reduced DI use will be overstated. Indeed,
Borghans et al. (2014) document that while the reform lowered DI participation
and benefits for those directly affected, a sizable portion of this loss was replaced by
increased participation in other social assistance programs in the short run. Similar
program substitution occurs for the directly affected parents in our sample.
With this motivation in mind, we pool together all of the miscellaneous benefit
programs besides DI which are part of the social safety net in the Netherlands, and
see if a child’s receipt of these other benefits is affected by having a parent subject
to the harsher DI rules. The right graph in Figure 3 reveals no noticeable change in
other benefit receipt at the cutoff. Table 3 confirms that the point estimate is small
and statistically insignificant. The table breaks things down further by separately
reporting RD estimates for UI income, general assistance (traditional cash welfare),
and the remaining miscellaneous benefit programs. For each type of benefit category,
the estimates are small and insignificant.
These results stand in stark contrast to those of their parents, who themselves had
substantial substitution to these other programs in the short run (in particular to the
UI program). This means that a parent’s increased reliance on these other transfer
programs did not transfer to their children. Any learning and spillover effects are
apparently linked to the DI program itself. The conclusion is that the cost savings
from the next generation due to lower DI use is not offset by increased participation
in other programs.
C. Labor Market Earnings and Taxes Paid
We now turn to labor market earnings and taxes paid by children. The left panel
of Figure 4 plots the cumulative earnings of children for the 16 year period from
1999 to 2014. Cumulative earnings includes wage income as well as income from self
employment. In this graph, we plot the residuals from a regression of child earnings
on child age. The reason to plot residuals is that children’s cumulative earnings have
a steep own-age profile and child age increases on average with their parent’s age as
of the reform date. This makes the range of the y-axis so wide with raw data that it
is difficult to zoom in on the RD jump at the cutoff.15 The left figure shows a jump
15We note that while child age is positively correlated with parent age, this should not be a problem,
as child age is smooth through the RD cutoff. Using child age as the outcome variable, and parent’s
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in cumulative child earnings at the parental age cutoff. Turning to Table 4, the RD
estimate is an increase of a little over 7 thousand euros in earnings for children whose
parents were subject to the reform. This is roughly a 2% increase in earnings relative
to the overall mean.
While earnings changes are inherently interesting, what matters for the govern-
ment’s balance sheet is taxes minus transfers. We therefore calculate predicted taxes
for children from 1999 to 2014.16 The right graph of Figure 4 plots cumulative child
tax payments versus the running variable of parental age. As we did for earnings, we
first regress out a child’s age for this graph. Table 4 documents a large and statistically
significant reduced form effect on taxes: estimated taxes paid rise by two thousand
euros, which is a little under 2% of the mean.
VI. Fiscal Consequences
A. Cumulative Fiscal Effects
To provide a more comprehensive picture of the fiscal spillover effects, we estimate
the cumulative change in taxes minus transfers up through 2014. Policy makers
should ultimately be concerned with this net effect, since this is what matters for the
government’s budget. To do this, we create a variable which combines DI and all
other government transfer program payments and subtract this from taxes paid by a
child. As shown in Table 4, we find that taxes minus transfers increase by 3,483 euros
(s.e.=1,271) for children of parents who were subject to the stricter DI rules.
To provide further insight into the fiscal effects over time, Figure 5 plots year-
by-year RD estimates for cumulative DI benefits, cumulative other transfers, and
cumulative tax payments over time. There is a small, but statistically significant
savings in DI payments in the first five years, and this effect grows larger over time.
In contrast, other cumulative transfers are close to zero and insignificant for the entire
period. Cumulative tax payments, plotted in the upper left graph, start out small
and rise little in the first 5 years. This makes sense, as many of the children are still
in school and have not yet begun working full time in the early years of our data. But
age as the running variable, yields a small, and statistically insignificant jump of -.044 (s.e.=.066) at
the cutoff.
16We calculate taxes using the relevant tax brackets for each year. We allow individuals to carry
losses backward and forward, as specified by the Dutch tax code. The rules specify that losses are
first used to offset positive income in the last three years, with further losses being carried forward
for up to nine years. Since our income data begins in 1999, we are limited in applying carrybackward
losses until 2002. As an alternative, we also tried using a variable which ignored the ability to offset
losses. The results using this alternative tax measure are similar.
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the increase in estimated tax payments rises with time, so that by 2006 the effect
becomes statistically significant.
The lower right panel in Figure 5 plots the net effect of taxes minus transfers over
time. It mirrors the reduction in DI payments and the rise in tax payments over
time, as expected. It is interesting to note that by 2014, increased taxes account for a
slightly larger fraction of the net savings to the government’s budget compared to the
reduction in DI payments. This highlights the limitation of looking at DI in isolation,
without considering other possible fiscal spillovers. We note that 90% confidence
intervals are shown for visual clarity in Figure 5; the cumulative DI benefits, the
cumulative tax payments, and the cumulative taxes minus transfers estimates are all
statistically different from zero at the 5% significance level by 2014.
B. Budget Savings from Children versus Parents
To gauge the importance of child spillovers, we compare the budget savings of the
reform, including all transfers and taxes, due to children versus their parents. Borghans
et al. (2014) estimate direct effects on parents from 1999 to 2005. We extend their
analysis to calculate a measure of the cumulative fiscal costs for parents until mandatory
retirement at age 65, which occurs in 2013 for parents at the reform cutoff. Mandatory
retirement complicates this calculation, as once parents within the estimation window
start reaching age 65, we can no longer use an RD design. This is because parents over
age 65 are no longer eligible for DI benefits and instead automatically begin to collect
their government provided pension (which is a fixed amount and does not depend on
work history).
To deal with this, we estimate the cumulative fiscal effects using an RD design for
each year from 1999 to 2008, before any parents in our estimation window reach age
65. It turns out the increase in cumulative net taxes minus all transfers is remarkably
linear in years; a regression of the estimated RD coefficients on a year trend has a
slope coefficient of 1,167.7 euros (s.e.=21.4) and an R-squared of 0.997. We then
extrapolate this linear trend for the years 2009 to 2013. Assuming a discount rate of
3% per year, we calculate a PDV budgetary savings of 12,999 euros per parent exposed
to the reform up through 2013. Using the RD estimates for children from Figure 5, we
calculate a PDV budgetary savings of 3,485 euros from children per exposed parent
(taking into account that some parents have more than one child).17
These calculations imply the child spillover effects account for 21% of the fiscal
benefits of the reform by 2013. This is likely an underestimate going forward in
17All figures are indexed to be in 2014 euros.
19
time, however. This is because while the parents are no longer eligible to work or
participate in DI, their children have an average of 30 years of DI eligibility and work
life remaining. Extrapolating the estimated child spillovers beyond 2013, we calculate
that 40% of the present discounted value of the savings in the long run is due to
children.18 Moreover, the full fiscal savings of the reform due to children is likely to be
much larger, as we only capture the portion due to complementarity between parents
and children, but not the main effect of the reform itself on child DI use.
Projections about future DI use and taxes paid by both parents and children
should be viewed as suggestive, in part because the economic and policy environment
is likely to change over time. These rough estimates also do not include the public
costs and benefits associated with the extra education, lower crime and imprisonment,
and improved mental health we document in the next section. But the basic point
remains: fiscal spillovers from the next generation are nontrivial, and ignoring their
effects greatly understates the cost savings of the reform in the long run.
VII. Spillovers in Education, Crime, and Mental Health
When viewed in isolation, the fact that children participate less in DI if a parent is
exposed to the reform could be either good or bad. If children participate less in DI
even though they have a debilitating condition, or if the reduction in family income
harms a child’s development, then children in treated families are worse off. However,
children could also react positively to the parental shock. The fact that children earn
more and do not change their participation in other government benefit programs
suggests increased self-sufficiency. To further explore whether affected children are
better or worse off, we examine three child outcomes which are key markers of future
well-being: educational investments, criminal activity, and mental illness in adulthood.
A. Educational Investments
We first examine whether children alter their educational investments. We collected
data on children’s educational attainment as of 2014. In Figure 6, the left graph plots
child years of education against the running variable of the parent’s age as of the
reform date. While most children will be done with their formal education by 2014,
not all are. Indeed, one can see in the figure that education trends slightly upward in
18We use a linear extrapolation based on the RD estimates for taxes minus transfers for 2005-2014.
We exclude 1999-2004, since the lower right panel of Figure 5 reveals a different trend when children
are finishing school and beginning their work life. A regression of the estimated RD coefficients on a
year trend has a slope coefficient of 255.6 euros (s.e.=7.8) and an R-squared of 0.992.
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the graph as a function of parental age, which is correlated with child age. Table 5
reports the corresponding estimate and standard error for years of education. There
is a significant jump at the reform cutoff, with children of reform-exposed parents
getting 0.12 years more education, relative to a mean of 11.5 years.
The right panel in Figure 6 plots the RD graph with upper secondary school
completion (roughly the equivalent of High School in the U.S.) as the outcome variable.
There is a significant jump of 2.2 percentage points at the reform cutoff, as documented
in Table 5. This is a modestly sized, but economically significant, effect relative to
the overall mean of 78%.
Table 5 further reports RD estimates for other levels of schooling.19 We find no
effect of a parent’s exposure to the DI reform on their children’s completion of lower
secondary school. This is as expected, since most children are too old to be affected,
and most children complete this minimal level of schooling anyway due to compulsory
schooling laws. In contrast, children of reform-exposed parents are not only more likely
to complete upper secondary school, but they are also more likely to obtain higher
education. This could be in part because admittance to college requires completion of
upper secondary school.
These results are intriguing, because they provide some of the first well-identified
and precisely estimated evidence documenting anticipatory investments by children
as a result of parental program participation. The DI decision occurs in the future,
after a child has grown up and entered the labor market. But it appears that children
(or their parents) anticipate this lower reliance on DI and increased labor market
attachment in the future, and make different investment choices while they are still
young. These higher levels of education can help explain a portion of the increase in
earnings and tax revenue we observe, as we discuss later in Section A.. More broadly,
higher education levels are associated with increased life satisfaction and happiness
(e.g., Di Tella et al., 2001).
B. Crime
We next turn to an examination of criminal activity. Crime could decrease for two
reasons. First, the opportunity cost of committing crime should rise as children work
and earn more in the formal labor market. Second, if the home environment improves
or parents become better role models after reducing their reliance on DI (and increasing
their employment), this could help children stay out of trouble. On the other hand,
19As background, from the ages of 4 or 5 to 12 or 13, children attend elementary school. Further
education in secondary school is split into three tracks, and takes an additional 4 to 6 years depending
on whether the student enrolls in a vocational or college preparatory program.
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children’s crime could increase since treated parents have less time to supervise their
children once their employment increases. To evaluate intergenerational spillovers in
crime, we examine both arrests and incarceration.
Panel A in Table 6 reports results for having ever been arrested between 2005 and
2014, broken down by different categories of crime. The first entry looks at arrests for
any crime type, and finds a negative, but statistically insignificant effect. The next
two specifications split the crime types into minor versus serious crimes. Minor and
serious crimes are defined based on whether the crime an individual is arrested for
is associated with an above or below median probability of imprisonment.20 Minor
crimes include arrest categories such as shoplifting, threats, and traffic violations,
while serious crimes include arrest categories such as rape, residential burglary, and
arson (see Appendix Table A4 for a full listing). Using this breakdown, we find
small and insignificant effects for minor crimes. In contrast, arrests for serious crimes
drop by 0.54 percentage points relative to a mean of 3.63, which translates into a
15% reduction in arrests (see Table 7 for the corresponding RD graph). To provide
additional insight, we further break down serious crimes into serious violent versus
serious property crimes. There are sizable drops in both subsets of serious crime,
with 33% reduction for serious violent crime and a 12% decrease for serious property
crime.21
Panel B reports results for having ever been imprisoned between 2005 and 2014.
Children of parents exposed to the reform have a 0.29 percentage point lower probability
of being sent to prison, a result which is significant at the ten percent confidence
level. Relative to an incarceration rate of 0.165, this represents an 18% drop in
imprisonment. Imprisonment occurs for more serious crimes, so it is interesting to
see that the incarceration result lines up with the arrest result for serious crimes
(i.e., those likely to result in imprisonment). We note the arrest and imprisonment
data come from two separate data sources, each collected by different governmental
agencies, so the similar results are not mechanical.
20While we have arrest and incarceration information for each individual broken down by crime
type, we cannot ascertain which arrest is linked with which incarceration. Moreover, the crime types
listed in the arrest records are somewhat different compared to those in the incarceration records. So
to define crime severity, we take everyone who was arrested for a specific crime in 2014 (e.g., assault)
and then calculate the probability these individuals are incarcerated in 2014 for any reason. Serious
and minor crimes are defined as an incarceration probability above or below the median across the
48 arrest categories using the Standard Crime Classification of Statistics Netherlands.
21We do not have enough power to precisely estimate effects for each of the 48 crime categories
separately, but we note that almost all of the individual estimates are negative. One exception is
traffic crime, which is relatively common and has a large positive effect. This could reflect the fact
that traffic crimes require a car, which may be more likely if a person works and has higher earnings.
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C. Mental Health
Finally, we explore whether a child’s mental health in adulthood (when the data first
become available) is affected by a parent’s exposure to the DI reform. Our measure
of mental health is based on having had a prescription for one of several drugs. The
prescription drug categories are antipsychotics, anxiolytics, hypnotics and sedatives,
antidepressants, and psychostimulants. For Table 7, we limit the sample to children
age 14 or younger around the time their parents were exposed to the reform. We
focus on this age range because it corresponds to the critical period identified by the
World Health Organization, which notes that “Mental health evolves throughout the
life-cycle... The early stages of life present a particularly important opportunity to
promote mental health and prevent mental disorders, as up to 50% of mental disorders
in adults begin before the age of 14 years” (WHO, 2013). In the robustness section,
we report results for children of other ages as well.
In the first specification of Table 7, we find that adult prescriptions for any type
of mental health drug fall by 2.6 percentage points for children who were young when
their parents were exposed to the reform. This is relative to the average of 23% of
children having been prescribed a mental health drug by between 2005 and 2014, or
an 11% drop. Figure 8 graphs the corresponding RD figure. When we break up the
analysis into the 5 types of mental health drugs, the estimates are all negative and
economically meaningful, with effect sizes of 23%, 13%, 30%, 11%, and 7% relative
to their respective means. When interpreting these estimates, it is important to
remember that we are using exposure at a young age to measure mental health drug
use as adults. One interpretation of our findings is that children experience a more
stable and less stressful home environment if their parent relies less on DI and more on
earnings from work.22 Children could also experience less stigma and stress by having
a parent in the labor force at this formative age. Another possible interpretation
is that the observed increases in education and earnings of the children themselves
contribute to more positive mental health.
VIII. Specification Checks
A. Effects by Child Age
To better understand the intergenerational spillovers just documented, in this section
we break up the estimated effects by child age as of November 1996. The reason to
22We do not, however, find any evidence for a change in parental divorce in response to the reform
(RD estimate = -.002, s.e. = .005).
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focus on child age as of this date is that it is when the Dutch Parliament decided the
45-50 year old cohort would be grandfathered in under the old DI rules. It is also
the approximate time when the re-examinations for the 40-45 year old cohort began,
and hence when children began to be differentially affected by the reform. We split
children into two roughly equally-sized groups: those who are 18 and younger versus
19 and older as of November 1996.23 To look at younger ages, we also present results
for children less than age 14 at the time of the reform. While it would be interesting
to look at even younger children, the sample of parents around the reform cutoff of
age 45 are too old for such an analysis.
Table 8 reports separate RD estimates for our main outcomes by child age. Looking
at the DI spillovers in specifications A through C, the effects are all large and
statistically significant for the younger groups. The estimated effects for the older
group, while going in the same direction, are smaller, especially compared to the
sample means. For other social programs in specification D, we find no effect for any
of the age groups, in line with what we found for the entire sample. When we turn
to earnings, we find a relatively large and marginally significant effect for the older
group. These increased earnings also translate into higher taxes paid, although the
estimate is marginally insignificant at conventional levels. For the younger groups,
the effects are the same sign, but smaller. This apparent puzzle, given the opposite
pattern found for DI participation by child age, has a simple explanation which we
return to after discussing the education outcomes.
Specifications G and H estimate the spillover effects on child education. The
estimate for the age 18 and younger group shows an increase of 0.17 years of schooling
associated with the reform, with the age 14 and younger group having a slightly
larger increase. In contrast, there is no statistically significant spillover in years of
education for those age 19 and older. Looking at upper secondary school completion,
we again find larger effects for the younger age groups. Upper secondary school is
usually completed by age 18 or 19, so for the older group, there is less time to affect
this schooling margin.24
How do these results fit together, particularly the stronger DI effect for the younger
groups and the larger earnings effect for the older group? First, it is important to
recognize that because of their age, the 19 and older group has had over three more
prime-age years to work in the labor market compared to the 18 and younger group;
23As a reminder, we limit our sample to children still living at home at the time of the reform
announcement, including children living at home while attending college.
24A small number of children complete their education at older ages if they are either on a 6 year
educational track or have previously repeated a grade.
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indeed, mean cumulative earnings for the older group are over 50% higher. On top of
this, the younger groups get more education, which delays the start of their prime
earnings years. Accounting for this education-induced absence from the workforce can
more than explain the difference in the earnings effects found across the age groups.25
Education-induced absences from the workforce can also help explain the stronger DI
result for younger children, as individuals cannot be enrolled full time in school and
concurrently on DI.
Turning to our final two outcomes, specification I reports results for serious crime.
The estimate is larger for the ≤18 split, but relative to their means, the >19 split is
roughly the same percent size and close to significant at the 10% level. Finally, the
evidence on mental health drugs is concentrated among the youngest age group, with
little evidence of an effect for either of the other age categories. While most of the
outcomes in specifications A-I are associated with statistically significant effects for
the entire sample of children, and often for the age subsamples, the mental health
result only shows up for the ≤14 age group. This could be due to the youngest group
being particularly vulnerable for the onset of mental health conditions (WHO, 2013).
Overall, the pattern of results in Table 8 indicates that younger children are more
strongly affected by their parents. A natural set of explanations is that younger
children are more impressionable, have a longer period to observe their parent’s DI
and work experiences, and have more time to alter their educational and work plans.
When younger children delay entry into the workforce to get more education, they
improve their future earnings prospects, but this reduces their ability to help out the
household finances of their parents immediately after the DI reform.
B. Effects by Parent and Child Gender
We next explore whether there are heterogeneous spillover effects by either parent
or child gender. We begin by splitting the sample into children whose fathers versus
mothers were affected by the reform. Results are found in Table 9. We find that
mothers have larger intergenerational spillovers on their children’s DI use and earnings.
For example, children of mothers affected by the reform reduce their cumulative
use of DI by 74 days, compared to 39 days for children of fathers. Likewise, the
25To make a comparison, focus on the age>19 versus age≤18 split. Treated children in the younger
group receive an extra 0.171 years of education, compared to 0.065 for the older group. A reasonable
estimate of earnings in prime age years can be taken from the difference in average cumulative earnings
for the two groups (448,788-290,500 euros) divided by the average age difference between the groups
(3.41 years). Assuming individuals do not work while in school, this implies an education-induced loss
of 5,431 in earnings for treated children. Adding this to the estimate of 4,744 for the younger group
(specification E) equals 10,175, which is larger compared to the estimate of 7,998 for the older group.
25
intergenerational spillover effects on child earnings are four times larger for mothers
than fathers. In contrast, fathers appear to be more influential for children’s education,
crime, and mental health outcomes. For example, children of fathers affected by the
DI reform are 2.4 percentage points more likely to complete upper secondary school
(i.e., the equivalent of high school in the U.S.), versus 1.3 percentage points for the
mother sample. Similarly large gaps exist for a child’s arrests and use of mental health
drugs. While the mother and father estimates are often statistically different from
zero, they are generally not statistically different from each other. This is in part
because of smaller samples sizes, particularly for mothers, who comprise only one
fourth of the total sample.
This auxiliary evidence for gender-specific spillovers depends on the child outcome,
in line with prior research. The results on mother’s effects on child DI use and earnings
are consistent with longitudinal data which shows that having a working mother
while a teenager influences future participation in the labor market (e.g., Stinson
and Gottschalk, 2016). The larger effects for fathers on education, crime, and health
are consistent with research which finds that fathers are particularly important for a
child’s cognitive and emotional development (e.g., Cabrera et al., 2007).
It would be interesting to explore heterogeneity by the interaction of child gender
with parent gender, since role model effects may be stronger when gender is the same.
Unfortunately, we do not have the precision to break up the data this finely. But
we can look at the intergenerational spillover effects on sons versus daughters, which
we do in the later columns of Table 9. Many of the interventions in the U.S. welfare
context find larger, and generally more positive, effects among girls than boys (e.g.
Hoynes et al., 2016). Relative to their sample means, we find estimated spillover
effects in DI use and earnings which are similar for sons and daughters. For education
there is a roughly 50% larger spillover effect for sons, although the difference is not
statistically significant. Sons drive the large decrease in arrests, consistent with them
being responsible for most of the crime in our data. Turning to the use of mental
health drugs, where daughters have a 50% higher usage rate, the effect of the reform
is concentrated among daughters. Our broad conclusion from these results is that
children of both genders experience sizeable intergenerational spillovers, with most
effect sizes being a function of the gender-specific means of the outcomes.
C. Robustness
Appendix Table A5 reports a variety of specification checks for our main outcomes.
For simplicity, the table only reports the reduced form estimates. The first row repeats
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our baseline estimates for ease of comparison. In Specification B, we allow separate
quadratic trends on each side of the cutoff; the estimates are larger, but the standard
errors also increase. The next two specifications remove the triangular weights and
the control variables from the regression, and yield similar findings to the baseline.
In specifications E and F we narrow the RD estimation window. As we shrink
the window down to 45 or 30 months on each side of the cutoff, the estimates
become somewhat larger, but the standard errors increase as well. All estimates
remain statistically significant (except for cumulative other transfers, which is never
significant). As an alternative set of specifications, we estimate local linear regressions.
Depending on the bandwidth, some of the estimates become insignificant, but the
point estimates are broadly similar to the baseline.
In specification J, we limit the sample to only include children not living at home
at the time of the reform. This can occur if the child has moved out or because a child
does not live with their biological parent (e.g., if the parent is divorced). With this
sample, we find no significant effect for most outcomes, which suggests that first-hand
exposure is required for the intergenerational effects to materialize. In specification K
we cluster the standard errors by parental age and find it makes little difference. The
final two specifications exclude non-native Dutch and children whose parents left DI
by 1995. The RD estimates remain similar to the baseline.
D. Placebo Tests
To further explore the validity of our estimates, we conduct placebo tests for our main
outcomes. To do this, we collected a completely different sample of children: those
whose parents were not on DI as of 1995.26 Since these parents are all subject to
the new DI examination rules (regardless of their age), they should not be treated
differentially. As a result, there should be no discontinuity at the 45 year old age
cutoff. Indeed, we find no evidence of a first stage for this sample.
Table 10 replicates our baseline reduced form specifications for child outcomes, with
the only exception being the different, and much larger, sample. There is no evidence
of an effect for any of these outcomes, with the point estimates being uniformly small
and statistically insignificant. This provides reassurance our results are being driven
by the change in DI strictness, and not other policies which differentially affected
parents at a similar age cutoff.
26As a reminder, November 1996 is when the Dutch Parliment passed the motion to grandfather in
the 45-50 years olds under the old DI rules. The grandfathering was contingent on being continuously
on DI from before the reform date in August 1993.
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IX. Conclusion
Mapping out the nature and breadth of intergenerational DI spillovers is crucial for
understanding long-term child well-being and budgetary impacts. But the endogeneity
of parental participation makes this a difficult task. To obtain causal estimates, we
take advantage of a DI reform in the Netherlands combined with high quality register
data.
Our results indicate that children respond strongly when a parent exits DI or has
their benefits reduced, with wide-ranging personal and societal effects. Children whose
parents were exposed to the reform are less likely to participate in DI themselves as
adults, do not increase their participation in other public assistance programs, increase
their earnings and taxes paid, invest significantly more in their education, commit
less crime, and have better mental health as adults.
As the reform only provides one instrument, we cannot disentangle how these
various causal outcomes influence and interact with each other. But we can perform
a simple accounting exercise which suggests the increase in education can account
for 48% of the increase in earnings for children of parents affected by the reform
(assuming an 8% return for each extra year of education). Likewise, the reduction in
DI participation can account for roughly 43% of the increase in earnings.27 Three
explanations consistent with our findings are that children learn about the labor market
from their parent’s increased employment, have a better home home environment, or
experience a scarring effect where they infer they cannot rely on government support.
From a policy perspective, our study serves as an important lesson for the evaluation
of costs and benefits from reforms to the social safety net. Considering current
participants only, without accounting for the long-run effects within families, would
be a mistake. We find that ignoring intergenerational spillovers underestimates the
cost savings of the Dutch reform by 40 percent in the long run. Additional benefits
which are harder to quantify in euros, but which are nonetheless important, include
children’s increased education, decreased criminal activity, and improved mental health
as adults.
Taken together, our results indicate the reform curtailing parental DI benefits had
positive spillover effects on children, both from an individual and societal perspective.
Lowering DI benefits for parents did not appear to create a resource trap which
harmed children and prevented them from being self-sufficient, even though parental
27This calculation is based on estimates from Table 6 in French and Song (2014). Using the upper
and lower bound estimates from footnote 51 in Maestas, Mullin, and Strand (2013) instead implies
it accounts for between 24 and 110%. One caution is the estimates from these papers may not be
directly comparable to the Dutch system and the complier types for our reform.
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income did not change in the short run and declined in the long run. And from a
government budget perspective, the resulting intergenerational fiscal benefits were
large. It is important to recognize, however, that our setting captures the effect of
lowering DI use for parents with marginal disabilities and substantial work capacity.
This is arguably the most policy relevant group, but care should be taken not to
extrapolate to other populations. In future work it would be interesting to explore
intergenerational spillovers in other settings, including instances with more severely
disabled parents or policy reforms where social assistance becomes more, rather than
less, generous.
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Figure 1. Effects of the Reform on Parents
Notes: Each observation represents average parental DI receipt in 1999 (left panel) or average
parental DI exit by 1999 (right panel) in 6 months age bins, based on the parent’s age as
of the reform date of August 1993. The dashed vertical lines denote the reform cutoff of
age 45. The solid trend lines are based on regressions using unbinned data, with dotted lines
indicating pointwise 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 2. Child DI Participation
Notes: Each observation represents average child DI participation by 2014 (left panel) or
average cumulative child days on DI by 2014 (right panel) in 6 months age bins, based on
the parent’s age as of the reform date of August 1993. The dashed vertical lines denote the
reform cutoff of age 45. The solid trend lines are based on regressions using unbinned data,
with dotted lines indicating pointwise 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3. Child DI and Other Benefit Receipt
Notes: See Table 3 and notes to Figure 2.
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Figure 4. Residualized Child Earnings and Taxes
Notes: See Table 4 and notes to Figure 2. In these graphs, we first regress out child age to
keep the range of the y-axis from being too large.
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Figure 5. Cumulative Fiscal Effects Over Time for Children
Notes: Each graph plots year-by-year RD estimates of cumulative effects, using the specifica-
tions of Tables 2-4. Dotted lines indicate pointwise 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 6. Child Educational Attainment
Notes: See Table 5 and notes to Figure 2.
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Figure 7. Child Serious Crime
Notes: See Table 6 and notes to Figure 2.
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Figure 8. Child Mental Health
Notes: See Table 7 and notes to Figure 2. This graph is limited to children who were age 14
or younger at the time of implementation (November 1996).
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Table 1. RD Estimates of the Reform on Parental DI
Dependent variable First Stage Mean
A. Parental DI benefits -1.300** 10.063
(in 1,000 euros) (.095)
B. Parental exit from DI .054** .114
(.005)
Observations 116,356
Notes: The sample is parents between the ages of 40-50 and on DI as of the reform date of
August 1, 1993, who were still on DI in 1995, and had children living at home around the
time of the reform. Parental DI benefits measure payments received in 1999, indexed to the
year 2014. Parental exit measures whether the parent has exited DI by 1999. All coefficients
are estimated using an RD model with separate linear trends on each side of the cutoff and
triangular weights. Parent control variables are measured as of January 1, 1996 and include
age, birth month dummies, a gender dummy, a cubic in pre-disability earnings, a dummy
for no pre-disability earnings, six dummies for degree of disability, a cubic in DI duration, a
dummy for native Dutch, a marriage dummy, and number of children in the household; child
control variables include age and a gender dummy. Parents appear more than once if they
have more than one child. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<.05, *p<.10
Table 2. RD Estimates of Child DI Participation
Child outcome in 2014 RF Mean
A. Ever on DI -.011** .104
(.004)
B. Cumulative days on DI -47.2** 298
(13.9)
Observations 116,356
Notes: See notes to Table 1. The independent variables measure whether a child ever
participated in DI between 1996 and 2014 and the cumulative number of days on DI between
1996 and 2014. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<.05, *p<.10
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Table 3. RD Estimates of Child Benefits from DI and Other Government Programs
Child outcome in 2014 (in 1,000 euros) RF Mean
A. DI benefits
A1. Cumulative DI income -1.578** 10.107
(.499)
B. Other benefits
B1. Cumulative total benefits, excluding DI .092 13.746
(B2+B3+B4) (.379)
B2. Cumulative UI income -.067 5.639
(.162)
B3. Cumulative general assistance income .092 4.432
(traditional cash welfare) (.266)
B4. Cumulative misc. benefit income .067 3.675
(all other government safety net programs) (.145)
Observations 116,356
Notes: See notes to Table 1. Independent variables measure cumulative amounts between
1996 and 2014, indexed to the year 2014. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
parent level.
**p<.05, *p<.10
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Table 4. RD Estimates of Child Earnings and Taxes
Child outcome in 2014 (in 1,000 euros) RF Mean
A. Cumulative income from work 7.178** 371.282
(2.836)
B. Cumulative estimated taxes 1.997** 109.565
(.969)
C. Cumulative taxes minus transfers 3.483** 85.712
(taxes - DI benefits - other benefits) (1.271)
Observations 116,356
Notes: See Table 3 and notes to Table 1. Independent variables measure cumulative amounts
between 1996 and 2014, indexed to the year 2014. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the parent level.
**p<.05, *p<.10
38
Table 5. RD Estimates of Child Educational Investments
Child outcome in 2014 RF Mean
A. Years of education .117** 11.49
(.050)
B. Lower secondary school or more -.001 .95
(.003)
C. Upper secondary school or more .022** .78
(.007)
D. Bachelor degree or more .017** .33
(.008)
E. Master degree or more .009* .10
(.005)
F. Advanced degree or more -.001 .01
(.001)
Observations 79,924
Notes: See notes to Table 1. Education is measured as of 2014. Upper secondary school or
more includes both academic and vocational tracks. The sample size in this table is smaller,
as education data is a census for younger cohorts, but a sample for older cohorts. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<.05, *p<.10
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Table 6. RD Estimates of Child Crime
Child outcome in 2014 RF Mean
A. Ever arrested
A1. Any crime -.0023 .1370
(A2|A3) (.0043)
A2. Minor crime -.0016 .1256
(low prob of prison) (.0042)
A3. Serious crime -.0054** .0363
(high prob of prison; A4|A5) (.0023)
A4. Serious violent crime -.0030** .0090
(.0012)
A5. Serious non-violent crime -.0037* .0306
(.0021)
B. Ever imprisoned
B1. Any crime -.0029* .0165
(.0016)
Observations 123,186
Notes: See notes to Table 1; the sample differs in this table because the data covers 2005-2014
and because individuals are required to be 18 or older by 2014. Minor and serious crime are
defined based on whether the crime an individual is arrested for is associated with an above
or below median probability of imprisonment. See Appendix Table A4 for definition details
and a listing of minor versus serious crimes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
parent level.
**p<.05, *p<.10
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Table 7. RD Estimates of Child Mental Health
Children 14 or younger
around implementation
Child outcome in 2014 RF Mean
A. Ever prescribed
A1. Any mental health drug -.026** .234
(A2|A3|A4|A5|A6) (.013)
A2. Antipsychotics -.011* .047
(.006)
A3. Anxiolytics -.014 .109
(.009)
A4. Hypnotics and sedatives -.015** .050
(.006)
A5. Antidepressants -.014 .132
(.010)
A6. Psychostimulants -.003 .041
(.006)
Observations 27,218
Notes: See notes to Table 1; the sample differs in this table because the data covers 2005-2014
and because individuals are required to be 18 or older by 2014. Moreover, we limit the sample
to children who were age 14 or younger at the time their parents were exposed to the reform
in November 1996. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<.05, *p<.10
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Table 8. RD Estimates by Age of Child
Child age around implementation
age ≤14 age ≤18 age>19
Child outcome in 2014 RF Mean RF Mean RF Mean
A. Ever on DI -.022** .091 -.019** .093 -.006 .114
(.010) (.006) (.006)
B. Cumulative days on DI -66.4** 255 -64.9** 265 -36.4* 330
(32.0) (19.3) (20.0)
C. Cumulative DI income -1.687* 7.979 -2.184** 8.677 -1.293* 11.480
(in 1,000 euro) (1.014) (.650) (.747)
D. Cum. total benefits, excl. DI -.536 8.036 -.318 11.553 .332 15.851
(in 1,000 euro) (.600) (.467) (.584)
E. Cumulative income from work 5.314 189.613 4.744 290.500 7.998* 448.788
(in 1,000 euro) (3.762) (3.080) (4.417)
F. Cumulative estimated taxes 1.208 48.861 .944 80.228 2.462 137.714
(in 1,000 euro) (1.042) (.973) (1.577)
G. Years of education .185* 11.33 .171** 11.57 .065 11.39
(.102) (.067) (.069)
H. Upper secondary school or more .031** .744 .028** .775 .015 .783
(.015) (.009) (.010)
I. Ever arrested for serious crime -.0066 .0590 -.0068* .0438 -.0047 .0281
(.0068) (.0037) (.0029)
J. Ever prescribed mental drugs -.026** .234 -.009 .262 .008 .288
(.013) (.008) (.008)
Observations (A-F) 20,388 56,974 59,382
Observations (G, H) 19,765 45,913 34,011
Observations (I, J) 27,218 63,804 59,382
Notes: See notes to Tables 1-7. Child age is measured as of November 1996, which is when
the Dutch Parliament passed the motion to grandfather in the 45-50 year olds under the old
DI rules.
**p<.05, *p<.10
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Table 9. RD Estimates by Gender of Parent and Child
Parents Children
Father Mother Son Daughter
Child outcome in 2014 RF Mean RF Mean RF Mean RF Mean
A. Ever on DI -.009** .101 -.018** .111 -.010** .090 -.013** .121
(.004) (.008) (.005) (.006)
B. Cumulative days on DI -38.7** 291 -74.1** 320 -41.1** 269 -54.5** 336
(15.7) (29.8) (17.3) (21.7)
C. Cumulative DI income -1.298** 9.712 -2.477** 11.339 -1.194* 9.149 -2.052** 11.347
(in 1,000 euro) (.550) (1.136) (.619) (.785)
D. Cum. total benefits, excl. DI .071 13.328 .143 15.051 .406 13.780 -.328 13.703
(in 1,000 euro) (.426) (.820) (.485) (.578)
E. Cumulative income from work 4.217 368.158 17.424** 381.158 8.222** 441.648 4.800 280.250
(in 1,000 euro) (3.115) (6.547) (4.007) (3.533)
F. Cumulative estimated taxes 1.202 107.326 4.827** 116.551 2.987** 135.808 .324 75.616
(in 1,000 euro) (1.051) (2.309) (1.421) (1.117)
G. Years of education .153** 11.36 -.001 11.90 .139** 11.26 .089 11.78
(.057) (.101) (.064) (.069)
H. Upper secondary school or more .024** .768 .013 .812 .025** .759 .017* .802
(.008) (.012) (.009) (.009)
I. Ever arrested for serious crime -.0059** .0362 -.0037 .0366 -.0080** .0557 -.0014 .0114
(.0027) (.0047) (.0038) (.0019)
J. Ever prescribed mental drugs -.030** .233 .002 .235 .005 .189 -.057** .281
(.014) (.029) (.016) (.018)
Observations (A-F) 88,114 28,242 65,627 50,729
Observations (G, H) 60,072 19,852 43,739 36,185
Observations (I) 93,557 29,629 69,066 54,120
Observations (J) 21,261 5,957 13,853 13,365
Notes: See notes to Tables 1-7.
**p<.05, *p<.10
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Table 10. Placebo Tests – RD Estimates for Parents Not on DI in 1995
Child outcome in 2014 RF Mean
A. Ever on DI -.0002 .057
(.0009)
B. Cumulative days on DI -2.126 158
(3.232)
C. Cumulative DI income -.150 5.346
(in 1,000 euro) (.117)
D. Cumulative total benefits, excluding DI .042 8.761
(in 1,000 euro) (.092)
E. Cumulative income from work -.041 378.393
(in 1,000 euro) (.940)
F. Cumulative estimated taxes -.178 110.906
(in 1,000 euro) (.360)
G. Years of education .010 12.56
(.015)
H. Upper secondary school or more .000 .87
(.002)
I. Ever arrested for serious crime -.0007 .0233
(.0006)
J. Ever prescribed mental drugs .001 .169
(.003)
Observations (A-F) 1,286,355
Observations (G, H) 971,599
Observations (I) 1,393,368
Observations (J) 415,157
Notes: The placebo sample is comprised of children whose parents were not on DI as of
1995. Since these parents are all subject to the new DI rules (regardless of their age), there
should be no discontinuity at the cutoff in any of the child outcomes. See notes to Tables
1-7 for details on the RD estimator, the included control variables, and the child outcome
variables. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<.05, *p<.10
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Online Appendix
“Intergenerational Spillovers in Disability Insurance”
Gordon B. Dahl and Anne C. Gielen
Appendix A: IV versus OLS Estimates
As a supplementary exercise, we compare OLS to similarly scaled IV estimates. To
construct OLS estimates, we use all parents between the ages of 40 to 50 at the
time of the reform who have at least one child still living at home with them. This
sample includes parents who were on DI as of the reform date, but additionally
includes parents who were not on DI as of the reform date. To make sure differential
re-examinations for those under versus over the age 45 cutoff do not drive our OLS
estimates, we split this sample into two groups: parents between the ages of 40 and
45, and parents between the ages of 45 and 50. We estimate the effect of parental DI
benefits in 1996 on each of our main child outcomes separately for each group.
To construct IV estimates, we employ our RD design and use the total drop in
parental DI payments, including drops to zero, as the first stage outcome variable (see
panel A in Table 1). To be valid, one must assume the exclusion restriction that there
is no direct effect of exit from DI (see Section B.), an assumption which is unlikely
to hold. With this caveat in mind, we report IV estimates to provide some type of
comparison to OLS.
Appendix Table A6 presents the OLS and IV estimates. The OLS estimates for the
younger versus older parent samples are generally quite similar, but diverge sharply
from the IV estimates. Specification A uses whether the child was ever on DI by 2014
as the outcome variable. The OLS estimates imply an extra 1,000 euros in parental
DI payments increases a child’s probability of participating in DI by 0.3 percentage
points for both the older and younger parent samples. This contrasts with the larger
IV estimate of 0.9 percentage points. Likewise, looking at days on DI, income from
DI, earnings, taxes, education, crime, and mental health the IV estimate is roughly
between 2 and 4 times larger compared to OLS. Interestingly, the OLS estimates for
cumulative total benefits from other social assistance programs is large and significant,
while the IV estimate is close to zero.
Why are the IV estimates substantially larger in general? There are several possible
explanations. First, the mean DI participation rate is higher in the IV versus OLS
samples (10.4% versus approximately 6.5%). Second, OLS could be biased due to
nonrandom parental changes in DI participation and payment amounts. For example,
in the OLS sample, a parent may be choosing to voluntarily exit because their health
has improved or their payments may be falling because they have found part-time
employment. In contrast, the IV estimates compare parents whose health conditions
and job prospects are presumably similar, but whose DI payments involuntarily change
due to an unexpected shock. A third reason is that the exclusion restriction could
be violated as mentioned above. A final reason is that IV estimates a local average
treatment effect (LATE) for compliers, while OLS estimates an average treatment
effect (ATE) for the whole population. The reform reduced DI benefits for marginal
participants who were deemed to have substantial work capacity. In contrast, OLS
includes parents with more severe disabilities as well as parents with little attachment to
the DI program. This difference is emphasized by De Haan and Schreiner (2018) when
discussing how to compare intergenerational ATEs estimated using their bounding
assumptions to LATEs estimated using quasi-experimental methods.
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Appendix Figure A1. DI Stocks and Inflows as a Percentage of Insured Workers,
1968-2016.
Notes: Data come from the Dutch Employee Insurance Agency (Uitvoeringsinstituut Werkne-
mersverzekeringen), as used in Koning and Lindeboom (2015). Estimates of the number of
insured workers are used to calculate receipt and award percentages for 2014 to 2016.
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Appendix Figure A2. Child Age as of the Reform Date of August 1993
Notes: Kernel density estimates of child age, trimmed to exclude .3 percent of the data for
visual clarity.
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Appendix Figure A3. Number of Observations by Cohort
Notes: The McCrary density test is insignificant (discontinuity estimate=.027, s.e.=.023,
p-value=0.25). The large trough and spike around ages 47 and 48 are the effects of WWII
(the “hunger winter of 1944”) and the subsequent baby boom.
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Appendix Figure A4. Covariate Balance, Parental and Child Characteristics.
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 2, but use pre-existing parental and child variables as
the outcome variables.
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Appendix Figure A5. Covariate Balance, Parental Degree of Disability and Prior
Months on DI.
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 2, but use pre-existing parental degree of disability bins
and prior months on DI as the outcome variables.
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Appendix Figure A6. Effect of the Reform on Parents
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 1, but with 3 month age bins.
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Appendix Figure A7. Child DI Participation
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 2, but with 3 month age bins.
5
7
9
11
13
15
C
hi
ld
 c
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
I b
en
ef
it
s
(i
n 
1,
00
0 
of
 e
ur
os
)
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
Age of parent at reform date
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
C
hi
ld
 c
um
ul
at
iv
e 
be
ne
fit
s,
 e
xc
lu
di
ng
 D
I
(i
n 
1,
00
0 
of
 e
ur
os
)
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
Age of parent at reform date
Appendix Figure A8. Child DI and Other Benefit Receipt
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 3, but with 3 month age bins.
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Appendix Figure A9. Residualized Child Earnings and Taxes
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 4, but with 3 month age bins.
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Appendix Figure A10. Child Educational Attainment
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 6, but with 3 month age bins.
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Appendix Figure A11. Child Serious Crime
Note: Graph mirrors Figure 7, but with 3 month age bins.
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Appendix Figure A12. Child Mental Health
Note: Graph mirrors Figure 8, but with 3 month age bins.
Appendix Table A1. Summary Statistics
Parent age: Parent age:
Overall 40-45 45-50
A. Parents
Female 0.27 0.29 0.26
Married 0.87 0.87 0.87
Age (Aug 1993) 45.17 42.58 47.36
Duration DI (months) 88.38 85.20 91.08
Degree of disability
15-25% 0.10 0.14 0.07
25-35% 0.12 0.14 0.10
35-45% 0.08 0.09 0.08
45-55% 0.07 0.06 0.08
55-65% 0.02 0.02 0.03
65-80% 0.02 0.02 0.03
80-100% (Full disability) 0.58 0.53 0.63
Pre-DI earnings (euros) 6,529 6,249 6,766
Native Dutch 0.91 0.91 0.91
Number of kids in HH 1.71 1.87 1.58
Parent observations 70,319 32,279 38,040
B. Children
Female 0.44 0.46 0.41
Age (Aug 1993) 15.60 13.86 17.27
Child observations 116,356 57,028 59,328
Notes: The sample in panel A is parents between the ages of 40-50 and on DI as of the
reform date of August 1, 1993, who were still on DI in 1995, and had children living at home
around the time of the reform. The sample in panel B is the children of these parents. A
degree of disability between 0-15% does not qualify for DI benefits. Variables are measured as
of January 1, 1996, unless otherwise indicated.
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Appendix Table A3. RD Estimates for Covariate Balance
Treatment dummy:
age<45 Mean
A. Parents
Female -0.007 (0.007) 0.27
Married 0.010 (0.005) 0.87
Duration DI (months) 1.778 (1.215) 88.38
Degree of disability
15-25% 0.005 (0.005) 0.10
25-35% -0.012 (0.006) 0.12
35-45% 0.007 (0.005) 0.08
45-55% 0.001 (0.005) 0.07
55-65% 0.004 (0.003) 0.02
65-80% 0.002 (0.003) 0.02
80-100% (Full disability) -0.006 (0.009) 0.58
Pre-DI earnings (euros) -17.205 (63.779) 6,529
No pre-DI earnings 0.0001 (0.005) 0.01
Native Dutch -0.005 (0.005) 0.91
Number of kids in HH -0.008 (0.023) 1.71
Parent observations 70,319
B. Children
Female -0.003 (0.006) 0.44
Age (Aug 1993) -0.044 (0.066) 15.60
Child observations 116,356
Joint F-test [p-value] 0.69 [0.202]
Notes: Each row is a separate RD regression, and uses the same sample and specification
as Table 2, except that each regression includes no additional covariates besides the running
variable. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
Appendix Table A4. Serious and Minor Crimes by Arrest Category
A. Serious crimes
Mugging, Theft of a car, Theft of a motorcycle, Extortion, Burglary in a school,
Theft of items from a car, Burglary in a shed/garage, Murder, Vandalism of a public
building, Rape, Burglary in a sports complex, Burglary in a residence, Theft of a
bicycle, Pickpocketing, Commerical theft, Trespassing, Arson, Possession of stolen
goods, Fraud, Assault, Other public disturbance or trespass, Gun offense, Violation of
court order
B. Minor crimes
Cybercrime, Drunk driving, Sexual acts with a minor, Other traffic violation, Leaving
the scene of an accident, Disorderly conduct, Miscellaneous civil offense, Public
indecency, Maltreatment, Stalking, Other sexual offense, Drug offense, Vandalism of a
car, Miscellaneous criminal offense, Disrespecting public authority, Other violent
offense, Other financial crime, Driving with a suspended license, Forgery, Shoplifting,
Other theft or burglary, Kidnapping, Other Vandalism, Threats
Notes: These are translations of the 48 arrest categories used in the Standard Crime Classifi-
cation of Statistics Netherlands. To categorize serious versus minor crime, we take everyone
who was arrested for a specific crime in 2014 (e.g., assault) and then calculate the probability
that these individuals are incarcerated in 2014 for any reason. Serious and minor crimes
are defined as an incarceration probability above or below the median across the 48 arrest
categories, respectively.
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Appendix Table A6. OLS versus IV Estimates
Independent variable: Parental DI
payments in 1996 (in 1,000 euros)
OLS IV
Parent age: Parent age:
Child outcome in 2014 40-45 45-50 40-50
A. Ever on DI 0.003 0.003 0.009
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
B. Cumulative days on DI 8.6 8.4 37.5
(0.3) (0.3) (14.6)
C. Cumulative DI income 0.293 0.289 1.256
(in 1,000 euro) (0.009) (0.010) (0.522)
D. Cumulative total benefits, excl. DI 0.230 0.235 -0.073
(in 1,000 euro) (0.007) (0.008) (0.388)
E. Cumulative income from work -2.383 -2.964 -5.711
(in 1,000 euro) (0.062) (0.080) (2.951)
F. Cumulative estimated taxes -0.668 -0.933 -1.589
(in 1,000 euro) (0.023) (0.032) (1.008)
G. Years of education -0.052 -0.050 -0.096
(0.001) (0.001) (0.050)
H. Upper secondary school or more -0.005 -0.005 -0.018
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
I. Ever arrested for serious crime 0.0009 0.0009 0.0042
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0024)
J. Ever prescribed mental drugs 0.004 0.004 0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Notes: OLS samples include children still living at home, regardless of whether the parent
was on DI as of the reform date. The OLS samples are split into two parental age groups
to ensure the stricter DI rules for those parents under versus over the age 45 cutoff do not
contribute to the estimates. See notes to Table 1 for a list of control variables. Samples sizes
for the three columns, in order, are: A-F 498,378; 421,731; 116,356, G, H 387,264; 287,799;
79,924, I 923,119; 612,885; 123,186, J 368,372; 85,202; 27,218. The IV estimates scale the
RF estimates using the drop in DI payments, assuming exit itself has no effect; see Tables
1-7. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
